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Abstract
Mathematical models of the interplay between disease dynamics and human behavioural dynamics
can improve our understanding of how diseases spread when individuals adapt their behaviour in
response to an epidemic. Accounting for behavioural mechanisms that determine uptake of infec-
tious disease interventions such as vaccination and non-pharmaceutical interventions (NPIs) can
significantly alter predicted health outcomes in a population. However, most previous approaches
that model interactions between human behaviour and disease dynamics have modelled behaviour
of these two interventions separately. Here, we develop and analyze an agent based network model
to gain insights into how behaviour toward both interventions interact adaptively with disease dy-
namics (and therefore, indirectly, with one another) during the course of a single epidemic where
an SIRV infection spreads through a contact network. In the model, individuals decide to become
vaccinated and/or practice NPIs based on perceived infection prevalence (locally or globally) and
on what other individuals in the network are doing. We find that introducing adaptive NPI be-
haviour lowers vaccine uptake on account of behavioural feedbacks, and also decreases epidemic
final size. When transmission rates are low, NPIs alone are as effective in reducing epidemic final
size as NPIs and vaccination combined. Also, NPIs can compensate for delays in vaccine availability
by hindering early disease spread, decreasing epidemic size significantly compared to the case where
NPI behaviour does not adapt to mitigate early surges in infection prevalence. We also find that
including adaptive NPI behaviour strongly mitigates the vaccine behavioural feedbacks that would
otherwise result in higher vaccine uptake at lower vaccine efficacy as predicted by most previous
models, and the same feedbacks cause epidemic final size to remain approximately constant across
a broad range of values for vaccine efficacy. Finally, when individuals use local information about
others’ behaviour and infection prevalence, instead of population-level information, infection is con-
trolled more efficiently through ring vaccination, and this is reflected in the time evolution of pair
correlations on the network. This model shows that accounting for both adaptive NPI behaviour
and adaptive vaccinating behaviour regarding social effects and infection prevalence can result in
qualitatively different predictions than if only one type of adaptive behaviour is modelled.
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1. Introduction1
Infectious disease outbreaks have the potential to cause unexpected burdens and panic in so-2
cieties. For example, the outbreak of severe acute respiratory syndrome (SARS) in 2003 caused3
significant economic impacts across the world, despite lasting only six months [1]. Occurring unex-4
pectedly, outbreaks such as the aforementioned SARS outbreak [1, 2], the Middle East respiratory5
syndrome outbreak in 2012 [3], Ebola outbreak in 2014 [4], or an influenza pandemic, which has6
happened as recently as 2009 [5], can be difficult to predict and can spread locally or globally and7
last anywhere from months to years.8
Human behaviour can have a large impact on the spread of infectious diseases [6]. People have9
been observed to change their regular social routines in response to an epidemic, in order to reduce10
their risk of becoming infected [7, 8, 9]. The infection prevalence or incidence of a disease in a com-11
munity serves to drive these behavioural changes, as an individual’s perceived susceptibility generally12
rises along with these disease measures [6, 10, 11, 12]. There are two primary self protective interven-13
tion strategies susceptible members of a population can utilize to reduce their chances of contracting14
a disease. These are pharmaceutical interventions, such as vaccination, and non-pharmaceutical15
interventions (NPIs), such as social distancing and increased hand washing [13]. The usage of these16
intervention strategies are voluntary in many health jurisdictions, and so perceived risks play an17
important role in how often they are utilized [14].18
Coupled disease-behaviour models combine human decision making behaviour with traditional19
transmission dynamics, helping to capture an additional, and often important, aspect of disease20
spread [6, 15, 16]. Behaviourally based models that incorporate NPIs and social distancing during21
an outbreak show that these practices can lower the attack rate of a disease [17, 18, 19, 20, 21,22
22, 23, 24]. Suppressing an outbreak using these means can be very critical, as vaccines may not23
always be immediately available to the general population [25]. Modelling how NPIs are utilized24
can be approached in various ways by mathematical models. For example, Funk et al [19] allow25
an individual’s level of awareness to the presence of a disease shape their usage of self-protective26
measures. Rizzo et al. model a population where susceptible individuals base their activity rates27
on the infection prevalence of a disease in the population or the infection incidence over a time step28
[20]. Similarly, Bagnoli et al. [21] and Del Valle et al. [17] have individuals lower their susceptibility29
according to the proportion of their contacts in a transmission network that are infectious, and30
to the infection prevalence, respectively. Poletti et al. [23, 24] incorporate imitation dynamics to31
model the behavioural changes of the population. Finally, Fenichel et al. [22] and Chen et al. [26]32
study models where individuals derive utility from engaging in social contact, but raise their risk of33
infection when doing so. In these aforementioned models, each individual’s behaviour is shaped by34
the information they gather about the disease status of those around them. Thus, in these models,35
transmission dynamics depend heavily on the perceived risks that drive contact patterns.36
Further approaches to mathematical models that integrate self protective behaviour into disease37
transmission utilize adaptive and multiplex networks. An adaptive network is a network whose edges38
between contacts change dynamically over time. Using these, Gross et al. [27], Shaw and Schwartz39
[28, 29] and Zanette and Risau-Gusman [30] allow susceptible nodes to rewire their existing connec-40
tions away from infectious nodes at a given rate. The approach of multiplex networks helps41
to model the many types of social networks individuals may use to acquire information,42
and Granell et al. [31] and Cozzo et al. [32] use these to study the impact of different43
information flows on the spread of epidemics. On the other hand, Glass et al. [33] and Kelso44
et al. [34] use contact networks which include families, schools, and workplaces to study the effects45
of various NPIs such as school closures and staying at home while infectious.46
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Additionally, vaccines (if available) play a major role in reducing infection rates during an epi-47
demic. Some mathematical models have shown that under voluntary vaccination, populations may48
not reach sufficient uptake levels to stop an epidemic [35, 36]. However, under voluntary policies49
in a network, Zhang et al. demonstrate that nodes with high degree can help to suppress disease50
spread through their increased desires to vaccinate [37]. During an outbreak, complications may51
arise when there are delays in vaccination. As a result of a delay, epidemic final size can increase52
significantly [38], especially as the delay lengthens [39]. When considering the efficacy of a vaccine,53
Wu et al. suggest through their model that a less effective vaccine causes vaccine uptake to increase54
(to an effectiveness of about 50%), especially for more serious diseases [40]. Insights from the models55
discussed above, as well as more empirically based research [41], have shown that perceived risks play56
an important factor in an individual’s decision to protect themselves through vaccination. These57
risks include perceived susceptibility to the illness and perceived risks associated with vaccinating58
(due to potential side effects) [42, 43]. Much like NPIs, members of a population will base their59
vaccination decisions on information they are able to gather about the disease during an outbreak.60
Perceived risks surrounding a disease play a crucial role in vaccination and NPI decisions. Infor-61
mation that shapes these perceptions is gathered by individuals in a population and may be derived62
from local information [9, 8, 44] (such as social contact networks), or through global information63
such as media reports about the population as a whole [44, 45]. We note that disease-behaviour64
models like those discussed above do not typically consider the intervention strategies of vaccination65
and NPIs simultaneously. However, it is clear that both are important factors in the spread of a66
disease. Andrews and Bauch [46] have studied the interactions of these two disease interventions67
with a utility based decision framework model in the context of seasonal influenza. In contrast to our68
previous work that considers long-term, year-to-year dynamics, here we develop a disease-behaviour69
individual based network simulation model to study interactions between vaccinating behaviour70
and NPI behaviour and their impact on health outcomes during the course of a single, and sudden,71
epidemic outbreak of a novel, self limiting infection, where perceived risks and social influence serve72
as the primary drivers of individual behaviour. Moreover, we include parameters that allow con-73
trolling the relative influence of local versus global information on behaviour. Our main objective is74
to compare how our model predictions differ from predictions of models that capture behaviour for75
only one of the two interventions, under various assumptions for (1) transmission probabilities, (2)76
timing of vaccine introduction, and (3) vaccine efficacy, and how efficacy influences vaccine uptake.77
Furthermore, we explore how the utilization of local versus global information regarding disease78
spread and vaccine uptake can alter network wide outcomes.79
2. Methods80
2.1. Disease Dynamics81
We consider a disease with a susceptible - infectious - recovered - vaccinated (SIRV) natural82
history. Susceptible individuals may become infected by their infectious neighbours with probability83
P (NInf ) = 1− (1−β)NInf per day, where NInf is the number of infectious network neighbours, and84
β is the transmission rate. Infectious individuals move to a recovered (and immune) state for the85
remainder of the epidemic in a number of days sampled from a Poisson distribution with a mean of86
7 days. Finally, susceptible individuals may choose to vaccinate and thus become immune for the87
duration of the epidemic. Baseline parameter values were calibrated to obtain epidemic final size and88
vaccine uptake trends within the plausible ranges of the corresponding measures in the United States89
for the 2009 H1N1 influenza pandemic [47, 48], although we emphasize that we are not modelling90
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influenza in particular, but rather we intend our disease represent a hypothetical self-limiting, acute91
infection where individuals only lose natural immunity on a time scale of years. We also assume92
that this is a novel strain of a disease, and individuals have no prior immunity - either93
natural or vaccine conferred. Full details regarding network structure, transmission dynamics,94
and decision modelling appear in the following subsections.95
2.2. Contact Network96
The disease is transmitted on a network consisting of 10,000 nodes which was constructed by97
sampling from a large contact network derived from empirical contact data in Portland, Oregon98
[49]. Previous research has shown that the subnetwork is a good approximation to the full network99
[50]. This network’s structure (see Supplementary Information (SI) Figure 1) remains static100
throughout an epidemic, and we assume that the edges in the network provide sufficient contact101
between individuals to allow potential disease transmission. We also run simulations testing102
our primary results on two other types of networks: random networks and power law103
networks. For details regarding these results, we direct the reader to the SI.104
2.3. Non-Pharmaceutical Interventions and Vaccination105
Susceptible individuals in the population may engage in self-protective behaviour in response to106
a growing epidemic. Their self-protecting activity is governed by both the presence of the disease107
itself [51] and by the social influence of their contacts and the population as a whole [23, 52]. To108
model this intervention use, we begin by allowing an individual to reduce their susceptibility to109
βNPI = (e
−(Φ+ΓNPI))β. Firstly, Φ is an individual’s risk perception of the disease, given by110
Φ = σf
(
λ,
INet
k
)
+ (1− σ)f
(
λ,
IPop
NPop
)
, (1)
where INet is the number of a given individual’s contacts that have been infected, k is the node111
degree of the individual on the network, IPop is the number of individuals in the population that112
have been infected, NPop is the population size, and σ dictates how members of the population weigh113
information gathered from their contacts and the population as a whole. Finally, f is a function114
that determines an individual’s response level to increasing infection incidence, given by115
f(x, y) = 1− exp(−xy), (2)
where x is a proportionality constant that governs the response dynamic (λ in (1)). Since perceived116
risks only increase in our model (due to the relatively small timespan of one epidemic),117
we use this functional form. Also, it is an increasing function bounded between 0 and 1118
whose shape (or response of increasing perceived risk to incidence) can be governed by a119
single parameter. Similar functions have been used in the literature surrounding disease120
spread and self-protective behaviour, for example, see [19]. Secondly, ΓNPIj measures an121
individual j’s imitation of others who are utilizing self-protective NPI practices, given by122
ΓNPIj = σf
γ,
kV ulnj∑
i=1
1− exp(−(Φi + ΓNPIi))
kV ulnj
+ (1− σ)f
γ,
NV ulnPop∑
i 6=j=1
1− exp(−(Φi + ΓNPIi))
NV ulnPop − 1
 ,
(3)
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where NV ulnPop is the number of susceptible or vaccinated (potentially vulnerable) individuals in123
the population, kV ulnj is the number of susceptible or vaccinated neighbours individual j has,124
kV uln
j∑
i=1
1−exp(−(Φi+ΓNPIi ))
kV uln
is the average amount of transmission rate reduction caused by self-protective125
behaviour amongst an individual’s susceptible neighbours,
NV uln
Pop∑
i6=j=1
1−exp(−(Φi+ΓNPIi ))
NV uln
Pop
−1 is the similar av-126
erage reduction induced by the susceptible population as a whole, and γ is a parameter that governs127
the response strength of imitation behaviour. Equation (3) captures how individuals reduce their128
probabilities of becoming infected through observations of others doing the same. This includes imi-129
tation of both network neighbours (σ), and imitation of how the entire population is behaving (1−σ).130
Thus, 0 < exp(−(Φ + ΓNPI)) ≤ 1 dictates how individuals lower their probabilities of becoming131
infected as they gain awareness of the epidemic by witnessing the disease spread throughout the pop-132
ulation. In our simulations, NPI use for each individual is updated non-synchronously133
in a new random order at the beginning of each day. Also, transmission rate reduction134
through NPI use will typically be ≤ 50% for any given individual, which is consistent135
with the available literature regarding the efficacy of NPIs [53, 54].136
If vaccines are available, members of the population may also choose to protect themselves from137
infection by receiving a vaccine. The decision to vaccinate becomes a more attractive option as138
vaccine uptake increases [55], and thus an individual’s vaccination decision will depend both on139
their perceived risk of the disease as well as the decisions of others to vaccinate. We represent this140
as141
σ
(
f
(
λ,
INet
k
)
+ f
(
γ,
VNet
k
))
+ (1− σ)
(
f
(
λ,
IPop
NPop
)
+ f
(
γ,
VPop
NPop
))
, (4)
where VNet and VPop are the numbers of a given individual’s contacts and total number of indi-142
viduals that have been vaccinated, respectively. If we define ΓV = σf
(
γ, VNetk
)
+(1−σ)f
(
γ,
VPop
NPop
)
,143
then (4) can simply be written as144
Φ + ΓV . (5)
Equation (5) combines an individual’s risk perception of becoming infected, which is based on145
local and global information of disease incidence, with an individual’s imitation of self protective146
behaviour, which also based on local and global information.147
If on any day a susceptible individual’s preference towards vaccinating, which we set as exp(−(Φ+148
ΓV )), exceeds a given threshold, θ, then that individual will be transferred to the vaccinated compart-149
ment. Otherwise, this is interpreted as an individual being undecided, and they therefore remain150
susceptible. This process is similar to methods from decision field theory [56], where individuals151
update their preferences towards making certain decisions based on available information. If their152
preference toward making an action reaches a pre-defined level, a decision is then subsequently made.153
3. Results154
3.1. Baseline Dynamics155
The baseline scenario of our model (Table 1) simulates an outbreak in a population whose156
individuals may protect themselves from infection using NPIs or vaccination. We call this the157
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baseline scenario as it was calibrated to achieve plausible epidemic outcomes under the realistic158
assumption that both vaccination and NPIs are available simultaneously. Henceforth, we will refer159
to this scenario as the “combined scenario”, as both interventions may be used. If both intervention160
options are available, the final size of the epidemic is lowest compared to when only one of the161
two interventions are used, as expected (Fig 1a). We also compare the epidemic time series of the162
combined scenario to hypothetical scenarios where there is no vaccine available over the course of163
the outbreak (“NPI-only scenario”), or self-protective behaviour is completely ineffective (“vaccine-164
only scenario”). We note that the NPI-only scenario gives similar infection rates as the combined165
scenario for the first 3 weeks of the epidemic. This occurs because vaccine uptake in the combined166
scenario is close to zero in the first few weeks, due to low perceived risks of becoming infected167
while infection prevalence is still minimal, and therefore the differences between scenarios with and168
without vaccination are small during this period of time. The implication of this is that delays in169
vaccine availability in the first few weeks of an epidemic may not hinder vaccine uptake under a170
voluntary vaccination policy. After this initial period, we observe consistently higher cumulative171
infected for the NPI-only scenario over the combined scenario for the remainder of the epidemic.172
The NPI-only simulations yield the greatest average cumulative infection incidence, as the response173
from solely NPIs amongst susceptible individuals cannot match the disease mitigation of a perfectly174
efficacious vaccine, in the long term (however, we note that the difference in cumulative incidence175
is relatively small). In the vaccine-only scenario, infection incidence spikes rapidly but the epidemic176
lasts a shorter amount of time than in the NPI-only scenario. The relatively rapid early spike in177
total infected individuals is due to the lack of vaccine uptake in the first weeks of the epidemic, as178
vaccination decisions are not activated until the perceived threat of becoming infected is sufficiently179
high. In all these cases, self-protective behaviour serves to slow the spread of an epidemic, but180
does not successfully reduce the final attack rate as significantly compared to when it is aided by181
vaccination.182
In the NPI-only scenario, NPI uptake amongst susceptible individuals is much more pronounced183
than when vaccination is also an option (Fig 1b). This occurs for two reasons. Firstly, if vaccination184
can occur, those that practice the strongest self protective behaviour due to having high levels185
of perceived risk will be amongst the first to vaccinate. In turn, this will lower the average NPI186
uptake amongst the remaining susceptible population. Secondly, if members of the population187
are vaccinating, the spread of the disease will be suppressed causing perceived risks of becoming188
infected to be lower. Thus, resulting NPI use will be less prominent. In the absence of vaccination,189
transmission reduction through NPI use simply continues to rise along with the infection incidence190
seen in Figure 1a. In the final vaccine-only scenario, total vaccine uptake is increased on average191
(Fig 1c). Moreover, vaccine coverage begins to rise earlier in response to the rapid spike in infection192
incidence that is observed when no transmission reduction is present through NPIs. Thus, when193
NPI effects are not considered, predicted vaccine uptake is significantly higher.194
3.2. Transmission Rate195
Time series of infection prevalence corresponding to different transmission rates can help us196
understand epidemic spread in our 3 scenarios (Fig 2). When the transmission rate is low, NPIs alone197
are relatively effective at hindering the growth of the epidemic, lowering the peak infection prevalence198
compared to the vaccine-only case (Fig 2a). For a transmission rate of β = 0.00493 per infectious199
contact per day, simulations that utilize NPIs only or vaccination only result in the same epidemic200
final size (Fig 2b). Although the peak infection prevalence in this scenario is larger for vaccine-only201
simulations, the epidemic dies out more quickly compared to the NPI-only scenario, resulting in202
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the same cumulative infection incidence over the epidemic duration. For higher transmission rates,203
the vaccine only scenario outperforms the NPI only scenario (Fig 2c). Although NPIs delay the204
peak of the epidemic, infection prevalence dies out more slowly than when the population uses solely205
vaccination instead. However, this highlights the importance of NPIs in epidemics where vaccination206
may not be immediately available. Considering the combined scenario data in Fig 2c, which indicates207
infection prevalence in simulations utilizing both NPIs and vaccination, the initial disease spread is208
very similar to that of the NPI-only scenario. Only when individuals begin to vaccinate does the209
infection prevalence in the combined scenario show quantitative difference to the infection prevalence210
in the NPI-only scenario. Thus, as long as a vaccine is made available within a given time frame,211
the final size can be expected to be the same due to the early activation of NPIs.212
Vaccine timing plays a critical role in the health outcomes of the population during an epidemic,213
across a range transmission rates (Fig 3). In the combined scenario (Fig 3a), a vaccine can be214
introduced up to 20 days after the start of an epidemic for the epidemic final size to be roughly the215
same as the scenario when a vaccine is available from day one, for baseline transmission rates. If216
we disregard the use of NPIs (Fig 3b), the vaccine must be made available within 15 days before217
we begin to observe larger epidemic final sizes. This effect is similar for β = 0.006 per infectious218
contact per day. In the combined scenario, a vaccine must be made available within 15 days before219
epidemic sizes increase. However, in the vaccine-only case, vaccine availability must occur within220
just 10 days. Finally, for lower disease transmission, vaccine introduction timing has little impact221
on infection incidence in the combined scenario. However, in the vaccine-only scenario, we see final222
sizes begin to increase when availability occurs after 20 days. From these results, we also notice that223
the rate of increase of epidemic final sizes corresponding to the timing of vaccine introduction are224
much greater. For example, given the baseline transmission rate, the difference in infection incidence225
between immediate vaccine availability and availability beginning on day 60 is ≈ 20% in the vaccine-226
only case. However, the same measure in the combined case is only ≈ 4%. Thus, the prediction227
from these two modelling approaches of epidemic size induced by vaccine timing introduction differs228
by about 16% of the entire population size.229
Finally, we also consider measures for epidemic final size (Fig 4). When the transmission rate230
is low, the final size is the same for the combined scenario as for the NPI-only scenario, but much231
higher for the vaccine-only scenario (Fig 4a). Hence, for low transmission rates, NPIs on their own232
can reduce final size as much as combined use of NPIs and vaccines, although the same is not true233
for vaccines on their own. This is due to individuals promptly adopting NPIs, which are targeted at234
the leading edge of the epidemic and quick to implement, curbing disease spread immediately. Also,235
vaccine uptake is much larger in the vaccine-only scenario than in the combined scenario (Fig 4b).236
In contrast, when the transmission rate is high, the final size is almost (but not quite) the same for237
the combined scenario as for the vaccine-only scenario, but much higher for the NPI-only scenario.238
Moreover, vaccine uptake is also nearly the same for both of the scenarios that include vaccination.239
Hence, for high transmission rates, vaccines on their own can reduce final size almost as much as240
combined use of NPIs and vaccines, although the same is not true for NPIs on their own. In the241
case of NPIs, the NPI uptake amongst susceptible individuals does not change for β >∼ 0.0045, due242
to the adoption of vaccination (Fig 4c). However, in the NPI-only scenario, susceptibility reduction243
through NPIs continues to rise along with the transmission rate.244
In summary, when transmission rates are sufficiently low, NPIs alone can be almost as effective245
as having both vaccines and NPIs (whereas vaccination alone is relatively less effective), but when246
transmission rates are sufficiently high, vaccines alone can be almost as effective as having both247
interventions (whereas NPIs alone are relatively less effective).248
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3.3. Vaccine Efficacy249
Vaccines are never 100% efficacious. For less effective vaccines, we can expect infection incidence250
and vaccination coverage to change as individuals in the population adapt to the quality of inter-251
ventions available to them. Thus, we explore the dynamics under various vaccine efficacies (denoted252
), and how they relate to vaccine coverage and epidemic final size with and without the additional253
impacts of NPIs (Fig 5). We note that in our simulations, vaccines give full protection254
with probability , and no additional protection with probability 1− .255
As vaccine efficacy decreases, the vaccine-only scenario overestimates the amount of vaccine256
uptake demanded by up to 16.5% of the population size relative to the combined scenario. We257
also observe that as vaccine efficacy decreases, the subsequent increase in vaccine coverage of the258
population is larger when NPI effects are not incorporated. For example, between efficacies of 100%259
to 50%, the combined scenario of the model predicts ∼ 3.5% more of the population vaccinating,260
whereas with the vaccine-only scenario, simulations predict an ∼ 8% increase. This effect is also261
seen with epidemic final size (Fig 5a). Across all efficacies, final size increase is only ∼ 1.5% of the262
entire population size with combined NPI and vaccine utilization, and ∼ 5.5% with only vaccination.263
Thus, we see that disregarding the impact of NPIs may lead to an overestimation of the population’s264
vaccine demand and final epidemic size. Moreover, the increases in vaccine uptake and final size with265
decreasing vaccine efficacy may be less significant than what previous predictions which disregard266
NPI effects show [40]. Finally, when incorporating vaccination decisions and self protective behaviour267
simultaneously into the model, we observe that predicted levels of vaccine uptake are much smaller268
than when no NPIs are implemented (Fig 5b).269
3.4. Pairwise Correlations270
As an epidemic unfolds across a network, the status of the nodes will develop while the disease271
spreads and intervention decisions are made. As a result, the spatial structure of infected and272
susceptible individuals on the networks will evolve over time as well. The correlation between these273
pairs can offer insight on the vulnerability of the network to disease spread and how individuals274
react to infection prevalence according to the information available to them, which we control with275
the parameter σ. To measure the correlation between node pairs, we follow Keeling [57]:276
CAB =
NPop
kavg
[AB]
[A][B]
, (6)
where kavg is the average node degree on the network. With this formulation, an increase in CAB277
indicates an increase in correlation as the number of [AB] pairs in the network relative to the number278
of type [A] nodes and type [B] nodes also increases. A value of CAB = 1 indicates no correlation279
[57].280
Considering the correlation between susceptible-infected ([SI]) pairs (Fig 6c), we observe a rapid281
initial spike in the network. This early increase is due to the first infected individuals spreading282
the disease to their network contacts, enabling more opportunities for transmission. As infection283
prevalence begins to peak (Fig 6a), infected individuals have a higher probability of being connected284
to a non-susceptible node, which results in the decline of CSI in the network, as distinct clusters of285
infected and other infected, recovered or vaccinated individuals develop. However, the correlation286
rises again as infectious nodes recover and only a final few clusters of infected and susceptible nodes287
remain, more so for lower σ as those who vaccinated are less likely to be connected to an infectious288
node. Correlations of vaccinated nodes with nodes that are or have been infected, [VI] and [VR],289
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respectively, also show how network dynamics respond to different levels of σ (Fig 6d,e). When290
individuals base their decisions on local information, that is, on the basis of the number of infectious291
neighbours (σ = 1.0), CV I and CV R are higher. This indicates successful ring vaccination occurring292
in proximity to the infectious individuals. Under strong influence of local information, neighbours293
of infectious individuals develop a high perceived risk and decide to vaccinate earlier. Then, so-294
cial influences reinforce this vaccinating behaviour, resulting in clusters of vaccinated individuals295
around infectious individuals. However, when decisions are made more strongly based on popula-296
tion level infection prevalence (σ = 0.5), [VI] and [VR] pairs become less common in proportion to297
all vaccinated and infected/recovered nodes since vaccinations do not always occur on the epidemic298
front. The cumulative vaccine uptake under global information is higher than under local informa-299
tion, however, vaccine uptake increases more rapidly in the early stages of the epidemic under local300
information (Fig 6b). This reflects the efficiency of targeted vaccination under local information,301
where vaccines are administered to the contacts of infectious individuals so that infection spread is302
efficiently prevented. Finally, as the epidemic dies out and infectious nodes become rare, [VI] and303
[VR] correlations across varying levels of σ converge to similar values.304
As σ decreases in our model, [SS] pairs become more common relative to the total number of305
susceptible nodes towards the end of an epidemic, increasing CSS (Fig 6f). On the other hand, with306
higher σ, final values of CSS continue to decrease. However, we note that during an epidemic, the307
opposite is true, albeit to a lesser extent. When σ = 0.5, vaccination occurs in locations other than308
the epidemic front, in turn decreasing CSS compared to higher values of σ. Nonetheless, the ring309
vaccination observed with increased σ is more efficient than the more random vaccine allocation seen310
when σ = 0.5, for example, due to the disease only being able to spread along the network edges.311
4. Discussion312
We have developed and analyzed a model that simulates a population’s adaptive self protective313
behaviour (use of NPIs and vaccination) in the face of a disease outbreak, in contrast to most previous314
approaches that model only vaccinating behaviour or only NPI behaviour. We allow an individual’s315
actions to depend both on their perceived risk of infection developed from their experiences with the316
disease on the network (both from their network neighbours and from the population as a whole),317
as well as imitation of the behaviour of others in the population.318
Surprisingly, when transmission rates are low, the NPI-only scenario offers comparable disease319
mitigation effectiveness to the combined scenario, while the vaccine-only scenario results in relatively320
larger epidemic sizes than either the NPI-only scenario or the combined scenario. For higher trans-321
mission rates, the opposite becomes true. That is, the vaccine-only scenario is almost as effective as322
the combined scenario for reducing infection incidence, but the NPI-only scenario fares worse. If a323
vaccine is not available immediately to the population at the start of an epidemic, epidemic mitiga-324
tion through adaptive NPI behaviour can curb the growth of an epidemic. Thus, if vaccination is325
made available to the population within a given time frame, health outcomes will be very similar to326
situations where a vaccine was always available. If, however, the effects of NPIs are not incorporated,327
then these time frames are comparatively shorter. Moreover, the increases in infection incidence for328
the vaccine-only scenarios are significantly higher the later the vaccine is introduced, resulting in in-329
creasingly higher predictions of epidemic final size. Finally, the impact of varying vaccine efficacy on330
both vaccine uptake and epidemic final size varies significantly between scenarios with and without331
adaptive NPI behaviour. The increases in both final size and vaccine uptake when vaccine efficacy332
is decreased are much higher for the vaccine-only scenario than the combined scenario. Hence, a333
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model of adaptive vaccinating behaviour that does not also account for adaptive NPI behaviour334
will make very different predictions than a model that accounts for adaptive behaviour toward both335
interventions. This again highlights the positive benefits of epidemic mitigation through adaptive336
NPI behaviour.337
From a network perspective, individuals basing their decisions to practice NPIs or become vac-338
cinated based on the infection prevalence and behaviour in their infection contact network leads to339
the most effective disease control. Pairwise correlations between vaccinated and infected nodes are340
highest when this information gathering is possible, as those that vaccinate are typically connected341
to infected nodes. We also tested the main results with two additional types of networks:342
random networks and power law networks (see SI). While the dynamics are qualita-343
tively the same, the amount of change in epidemic final size or vaccine uptake with344
differing vaccine delays or vaccine efficacies can depend on the specific network type.345
Assumptions about network structure and transmission are an important consideration346
- particularly when modelling a specific disease. For example, a transmission network347
for influenza likely has a different structure than one that would be used to model HIV348
transmission.349
In the combined scenario, epidemic final size is suppressed most effectively compared to when only350
single interventions are possible. Also, when the effects of NPIs are not considered in our vaccine-351
only scenario (an assumption which is common in previous behaviour-disease models focusing on352
vaccinating behaviour), vaccine uptake predictions are higher compared to when these effects are353
considered by our model, on account of counteractive feedbacks from NPI behaviour.354
Our model includes some simplifying assumptions about behaviour-disease dynamics. For exam-355
ple, NPI efficacy is poorly quantified in the epidemiological literature, and it is not always known in356
what situations individuals may practice them most often. Thus, we assume that NPIs for the357
spreading disease are not used initially, but in reality there may be some baseline level358
of NPIs used in the population due to other circulating diseases. Moreover, we do not359
model the effects of NPI practices that infectious individuals may utilize, such as self360
isolation. Instead, we make the assumption that infectious NPI use is absorbed into the361
transmission rate. Also, the network we used in our simulations could be extended to distinguish362
family, friend, and work structures, where transmission rates to an individual can vary depending363
on what category certain network contacts fall in. Similarly, age structure can be introduced into364
the model. As children will be much less likely to effectively practice NPIs, disease transmission365
in these groups may be more rapid than our model predicts. Finally, we did not include the366
impact of asymptomatic infections, and assumed all cases were identifiable in our main367
results. However, we also considered a scenario where 50% of cases were asymptomatic368
(see SI), and the primary results regarding vaccine efficacy and vaccine availability de-369
lays across various transmission rates are qualitatively the same. Although the main370
results are similar, in future work that aims to model a specific disease, accounting for371
asymptomatic infections is an important factor.372
Through these experiments, we see that predictions of health outcomes and vaccine uptake in373
a population can vary significantly when NPI use is, or is not, considered. It is important for374
behaviourally based epidemiological models to incorporate the effects of transmission reduction375
through this adaptive behaviour, as perceived risks of a disease will in turn be shaped by them -376
subsequently altering the outcomes of an epidemic. The same is also true of models that focus on377
modelling NPI behaviour, in populations where adaptive vaccinating behaviour could significantly378
alter model predictions of NPI practices.379
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Table 1: Baseline Parameter Values.
Parameter Description Value
λ Constant governing awareness/risk perception of disease 1.5
γ Constant governing behaviour imitation 0.5
θ Vaccinating threshold 0.35
σ Weighting for global versus local information 0.8
β Transmission rate 0.005
NPop Population size 10, 000
I0 Initial number of infectious persons 20
η Mean infectious period, in days 7
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Figure 1: Time series of an epidemic, 95% confidence intervals shown every 10 days around the mean of 500 realizations.
a) Cumulative infection incidence b) Transmission rate reduction due to self-protective behaviour (NPIs) amongst the
susceptible population, c) Cumulative vaccine coverage.
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Figure 2: Time series of infection prevalence with the vaccine-only scenario, the NPI-only scenario, and the combined
scenario. 95% confidence intervals shown every 10 days around the mean of 500 realizations. (a) β = 0.004 (b)
β = 0.00493 (c) β = 0.006.
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Figure 3: Epidemic final sizes with respect to when vaccination is made available. (a) With NPIs. (b) Without NPIs
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Figure 4: Epidemic measures with respect to transmission rate. (a) Epidemic final size. (b) Vaccine uptake. (c)
Transmission rate reduction amongst susceptible individuals.
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Figure 5: Effects of vaccine efficacy between scenarios with and without NPIs on (a) Vaccine uptake, and (b) Final
epidemic size.
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Figure 6: Time series of epidemics over different values of σ, the weighting for global versus local information . (a)
Infection prevalence, (b) Vaccine uptake, (c) Correlation between SS pairs, (d) SI pairs, (e) VI pairs, and (f) VR
pairs. Lines show the average values over 500 realizations.
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